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Abstract
We model the global maritime transportation system as a multilayer network of sea
routes and land routes that work together to deliver cargo on a global scale. The nodes
of this network represent seaports and maritime chokepoints, and the arcs represent
route segments at sea or on land, respectively. We construct our network using free,
publicly available data from online sources, and we reverse engineer the global demand
for container cargo transport. We use this layered network to identify important nodes
from a connectivity standpoint. We also develop a flow-based model that directs the
aggregate movement of goods between ports on the shortest and/or cheapest available
route, and uses re-routing strategies if a route segment becomes impassable for
container ships. We use this model to assess the impact of the loss of one or more
container ports or maritime chokepoints. Using the base case of no disruptions, we
measure the amount of goods that have to be re-routed in case of each disruption and
the corresponding “cost” of doing so. Collectively, these results present a novel view of
the security of transportation supply and set the stage for future work examining the
global resilience of maritime transport systems.
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Introduction
The global economy is heavily dependent on the efficient and reliable transportation of
cargo containers. The movement of these containers is facilitated by a global maritime
transportation network (GMTN) that consists of seaports, waterways, and landside
connections. This system has evolved over the last several decades to minimize
transportation costs and is now highly optimized for efficiency. As long as there are
no disruptions to the global system, all cargo sent through the system arrives at its
destination without delay. But unforeseen events, like container port closures (either
deliberate or non-deliberate) or disruptions at maritime chokepoints, can force the
shipping companies to choose different routes for the cargo, resulting in higher costs
or perhaps even making it even impossible for some cargo to be delivered.
Understanding the way in which the GMTN adapts or fails in the presence of such
disruptions is important for assessing and improving the security of supply for a variety
of industries and other operations that fundamentally depend on it.
The evolution of the current system is commonly attributed to two main driving
forces. First, lower labor and manufacturing costs in certain parts of the world have led
to outsourcing of production and a dramatic increase in international commodity trade.
According to the World Trade Organization (2007), the growth in world trade increased
from 1950 to 2005 by a factor of 27. As a result, there has been a growing need for
transportation of more and more goods across the world at cheaper costs. Second, the
development of the standard shipping container by the International Standards
Organization (ISO) in the late 1950s revolutionized global shipping. The standardiza-
tion of maritime transport, through the use of containers and increased mechanization
of the container handling in seaports, reduced the needed manpower by about 90% and
the container handling cost by about 80% (Huber 2014). The GMTN took advantage of
that development and grew very quickly. Within this global network, some seaports had
logistics advantages—for example, convenient geographical location and/or better
developed landside transport connections—and therefore, they were favored by the
transportation companies and became regional hub ports. In a manner consistent with
the “rich get richer” principle, these few ports grew faster than the others, became
global “megaports” and are today essential for the worldwide logistics.
Today, nearly a half of the worldwide container handling is transshipped through the
top twenty global megaports (Bruns et al. 2013). Therefore, today’s megaports are not
only important for the surrounding regions, but also for the entire GMTN due to
potential vulnerabilities that they might create. It is widely believed that the loss of
one or more megaports—as could happen from a natural disaster, terrorist attack,
infrastructure failure, or mere capacity limitations—could have severe global conse-
quences. One famous example is the West Coast port labor slowdown and lockout in
2002, when negotiations of labor agreements caused a stop of port operations for ten
days. As Los Angeles Times reports: “It took the West Coast ports 100 days to return to
normal operations” (Khouri 2015). It is believed a longer port shutdown would have
caused a shutdown of production lines in the U.S. and emptied the shelves in the malls
(Cohen 2002). More recently, Hanjin Shipping, the then-seventh-largest deep sea cargo
transportation carrier in the world, filed for bankruptcy in August 2016, leaving 80
cargo ships, their respective crews, and roughly $14 billion worth of cargo stranded at
sea or outside seaports for days or weeks (Cruz 2016).
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The importance of the GMTN is now well recognized, but much like other critical
infrastructure systems, such as electric power, water, or telecommunications, its con-
tinued operation is largely taken for granted. Flynn et al. (2017) highlight this point and
study the vulnerability of the global supply system, cautioning that it has the potential
to be targeted or exploited by terrorist organizations in the way that other systems, such
as passenger aviation, air cargo, and mass transit, have been. However, to date there
have been relatively few studies that address the operational resilience of this system.
This paper takes a first step in this direction by modeling a GMTN as a multilayer
network of sea routes and land routes that work together to deliver cargo on a global
scale. The nodes of this network represent seaports and maritime chokepoints, and the
arcs represent route segments at sea or on land, respectively. The two layers are given
by the sea routes versus the land routes, while all the nodes are present in both layers.
We construct our network using free, publicly available data from online sources, and
we reverse engineer the global demand for container cargo transport. We use this
layered network to identify important nodes from a connectivity standpoint. We also
develop a flow-based model that directs the aggregate movement of goods between
ports on the shortest and/or cheapest available route, and uses re-routing strategies if a
route segment becomes too congested or impassable for container ships. We use this
model to assess the impact of the loss of one or more container ports or maritime
chokepoints. Using the base case of no disruptions, we measure the amount of goods
that have to be re-routed in case of each disruption and the corresponding “cost” of
doing so. Collectively, these results present a novel view of potential disruptions and
their impact on the security of transportation supply on a global scale. It also sets the
stage for future work examining the global resilience of maritime transport systems.
Past work
Transportation networks are a common topic of study for analyzing network structure,
performance, resilience and other measures of interest. Transportation systems (air, land
and at sea) have received considerable attention in the academic literature. For example,
the Transportation Research Board (TRB) is a unit of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine that coordinates and manages transportation
research, conducts policy studies, and publishes reports on a variety of issues facing
the transportation industry. See Nagurney (2006) and Rodrigue et al. (2017) for an
overview of issues involving economics and geography of transportation systems. In
this section, we highlight selected work from this vast literature that is most relevant to
the current study.
Ports and port operations Because ports play a critical role in the movement of
containerized cargo, significant efforts have been directed at their modeling and
analysis. Pidgeon (2008) models the seven major ports of the U.S. West Coast to
evaluate potential disruptions and the corresponding costs inflicted on the shipping
industry. He examines the bottlenecks within each port’s infrastructure that can be
vulnerable to a transportation security incident (TSI), including earthquake, terror
attack, and worker lockout. Using these predefined scenarios, he estimates the impact
on vessel queue time and incremental costs, as well as downstream impacts on the U.S.
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economy as a whole. He considers the potential to re-route ships to different destination
ports, and provides recommendations for future investments to alleviate port
congestion.
Bencomo (2009) extends this work to consider infrastructure throughout the U.S.
and includes data for container flows between 46 countries and the U.S. ports. Using an
Attacker-Defender model, introduced by Brown et al. (2006), he identifies the worst-
case interdictions to the network, even after cargo has been rerouted. Martagan et al.
(2009) use a simulation-based approach to model the potential impact of port disrup-
tions on the GMTN. Focusing on seven ports within the U.S., they develop a queueing
type of model that simulates the process by which ships enter a port, unload cargo, load
cargo, and depart the port. In a manner similar to Pidgeon (2008), when a port is
disrupted, ships can be re-routed to alternate ports. The authors study the potential
benefit of this re-routing strategy, which we consider in this current research as well.
Several studies have also focused in more detail on the operations within a port.
Specifically, De la Cruz (2011) models operations in the Port of Honolulu and the
broader Hawaii Maritime Transport System at the level of individual terminals and
cranes, developing an optimization-based model to assess the throughput capacity of
this system under normal circumstances and during adverse events. He considers
alternate strategies to mitigate capacity shortfalls and system vulnerability, as well as
to improve the overall operational resilience of the system. Similar techniques have
been applied to the Port of Pittsburgh (Onuska 2012), the Port of Los Angeles (Mintzer
2014), and the Port of Anchorage (Wenke 2015).
Global sea route networks The study of maritime container transportation at the
regional or global scale has focused also on the network features of the system.
The growing field of network science has developed a variety of tools and
techniques for understanding the structure and behavior of systems based on their
connectivity; see Newman (2010) for a comprehensive introduction. Focusing on the
connectivity of seaports, as defined by the cargo ships that travel between them, Wang
and Cullinane (2016) develop a measure of “port centrality” (based on other well-
established measures of degree centrality, closeness centrality, and between-ness cen-
trality, discussed below) that captures the accessibility to other ports. Particularly for the
GTMN, Wang and Wang (2011) argue that, from topological point of view, the GTMN
has transitioned from a “multi-port calling system” to 44 regional hub-and-spoke
subsystems with a hierarchical structure, demonstrating a great diversity in linkage
coverage (probability that one port is connected with any other port) among different
regions. They report that based on centrality values, the GTMN network is dominated
by the ports of Antwerp, Singapore, and Hong Kong that act as regional hubs.
The sea route network has also been analyzed using network flow models with the
intent to characterize the global effect that ports play in the network’s resilience. Partial
reviews of the literature on disaster resilience of transportation infrastructure and ports
are available from Madhusudan and Ganapathy (2011) as well as Faturechi and Miller-
Hooks (2014). Chen and Miller-Hooks (2012) study the resilience of an intermodal
freight transport network, considering specifically activities that can be taken following
a disaster to mitigate performance. They assess resilience using a two-stage, stochastic
mixed-integer program for several canonical synthetic networks (i.e., a complete graph,
a random graph, and a grid network). Miller-Hooks et al. (2012) extend this work to the
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study the U.S. rail-based intermodal container transportation network, by analyzing
resilience, preparedness and recovery. They solve for the best portion of a fixed budget
to spend on preparedness and the portion to save for the recovery actions after the
disaster.
Kaluza et al. (2010) take a global view by modeling GTMN as a multilayer network,
aggregating the transportation flows of goods by type as well as by their specific
physical characteristics, each type being represented by a layer. They analyze this
multilayer network for ship movements, obtained from their automatic identification
system (AIS) transmissions, to understand patterns of global trade and bioinvasion;
these were further studied by Ruiz et al. (2000) and Drake and Lodge (2007).
The resilience of GMTN has been studied by looking at changes in the properties
and structure of the network following a disruptive event (e.g., port attack). Ducruet
and Notteboom (2012) show that the global shipping network is robust, in the sense
that the centrality of key nodes changes very little even when global trade shifts
following changes in network structure. Garcia Olalla (2012) models the GMTN using
a flow network that includes artificial transition points (group nodes) that bundle all
flow to and from multiple seaports within a region; aggregate movement between these
transition points then follows a type of “maritime highway.” He analyzes resilience by
considering one or more disruptions along route segments, expressed either as penalties
in time or cost, for ships that must avoid the interdicted routes. Jiang et al. (2015) also
use travel time and port capacity models to study the global influence of a port based on
its connectivity.
Other global transport networks The air transportation network has been studied by
several researchers who have identified its scale-free structure, community structure,
and central nodes (Guimerá et al. 2005). In particular, the European Airline
Transportation Network has received considerable attention: the anomalous
centrality distribution was studied by Guimerá et al. (2005); the most connected
cities versus central cities was investigated by Guimerá and Amaral (2004); the
multilayer structure and emergence of a single layer was considered by Cardillo
et al. (2013); a synthetic multilayer network was created by Basu et al. (2015);
and network flows in multilayer networks was studied by De Domenico et al.
(2015).
Network model construction
We begin our analysis with the construction of a network model for global maritime
shipping. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a single standard
representation for the global maritime transportation network nor is there is a single
non-proprietary repository from which one can obtain complete data to support its
creation. Therefore, an essential part of our work is the collection and aggregation of
data from various sources. In order to collect a large amount of information housed at a
variety of different online resources, we employ “web scraping” (also known as “screen
scraping” or “web harvesting”) to automatically gather data from the Internet; see
Mitchell (2015) for general background and Funk (2017) for details of the technique
used here.
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This section details the assumptions and methodology used to create a network
abstraction of the global maritime transportation network. In our analysis, we concen-
trate solely on the transportation of containers. Although there are potentially valuable
insights from an analysis of transportation for other goods (e.g., oil and bulk material),
these are not covered here.
Network nodes: Ports and maritime chokepoints
We introduce a global model that captures the maritime system such that we can
analyze its resilience based on one or several local attacks. We thus view the maritime
transport system as a network of ports that facilitate the movement of containerized
goods on a global scale. We consider two distinct types of nodes.
Our first type of node is a seaport, which we define as a location with the ability to
move container cargo between container ships and land. The global maritime transpor-
tation network contains hundreds of container seaports worldwide, but many of these
are small and do not handle much cargo. We focus on the most important container
ports of the world, measured in terms of the amount of cargo throughput. In all cases,
we use twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) as the unit of measure.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produces an annual World Factbook, which
contains various statistics about the countries of the world, published as a permanently
available online resource (Central Intelligence Agency 2017), including information
about ports and terminals. Specifically, we use an automated program to scrape
systematically the online version for every container seaport and its annual throughput
for every country. The currently available throughput data is mostly for the year 2011,
with few exceptions of 2010 and 2012. There are a total of 94 container seaports from
58 different countries, listed in Table 1.
The second type of node is a maritime chokepoint, representing areas with
restricted throughput and/or high concentration of ships, such as straits and
canals. Because sea traffic is naturally constrained in these places, chokepoints
create potential vulnerabilities to the movement of containers across the entire
network.
There are many places throughout the world that could potentially be considered
maritime chokepoints. Komiss and Huntzinger (2011) choose maritime chokepoints
based on established oil tanker transportation routes. These are located primarily on the
main routes from the Middle East and include the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of
Malacca, the Suez Canal, Bab el-Magdeb, the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles), and the
Panama Canal. Noer and Gregory (1996) consider chokepoints of the trade routes and
strategic straits in the Australasian Mediterranean Sea, which includes the Lombok
Strait and the Sunda Strait. Other considerations for chokepoints take into account less
frequented but still important chokepoints like the Magellan Passage or the Dover
Strait.
Based on these considerations, along with our previous selection of the container
ports, we choose the following 26 maritime chokepoints (Table 2), which cover the
routes between our selected ports.
In total, we have 120 container seaports and maritime chokepoints. Each seaport
represents a source and/or destination for container cargo transport. Each chokepoint is
a transshipment node through which cargo flows.
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Table 1 Select container ports for our model, along with their annual throughout, measured in Twenty-Foot
Equivalent Units (TEUs). Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2017)
Country Port Throughput






















Egypt Port Said 3,755,796




India Jawaharlal Nehru Port 4,307,622
Indonesia Tanjung Priok 5,617,562





Italy Gioia Tauro 2,264,798










Korea, South Busan 16,163,842
Korea, South Kwangyang 2,061,958
Korea, South Incheon 1,924,644
Lebanon Beirut 1,034,249
Malaysia Penang 1,202,180
Malaysia Port Klang 9,435,403
Malaysia Tanjung Pelepas 7,302,461
Malta Marsaxlokk 2,360,000
Mexico Manzanillo 1,992,176







Panama Manzanillo Int. Terminal 2,391,066
Peru Callao 1,616,365
Philippines Manila 3,342,200
Puerto Rico San Juan 1,484,595
Russia Saint Petersburg 2,365,174
Saudi Arabia Jeddah 4,010,448
Saudi Arabia King Abdul Aziz Port 1,492,315
Singapore Singapore 31,649,400
South Africa Durban 2,712,975









Thailand Laem Chabang 5,731,063
Turkey Mersin 1,126,866
Turkey Ambarli 2,121,549
United Arab Emirates Dubai 12,617,595
United Arab Emirates Khor Fakkan 3,234,101
United Kingdom Southampton 1,324,581
United Kingdom Felixstowe 3,248,592
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Network edges: Sea and land
Whereas nodes in our network represent physical locations on the globe, we use
network edges in our model to represent the abstract movement between nodes rather
than any specific physical route.
Although our primary interest is in studying the movement of cargo by sea, we also
consider potential movement of cargo by land, as an alternative in situations where sea
transport might be restricted. Thus, ours is a multiplex network model that has two
“layers”, one representing sea transport (i.e., the sea layer) and another representing
land transport (i.e., the road layer). Figure 1 depicts portions of the sea and road layers
as visualized in Google Earth.
We now describe the construction of network edges for these two layers.
Sea layer
The edges of the sea layer represent the maritime ship routes between container ports and/
or chokepoints. The natural spatial pattern of the seaport locations around the world
defines the structure of the sea layer. The seaports are always situated at one specific body
of water (e.g., the Atlantic Ocean or the South China Sea). By construction, the maritime
Table 1 (continued)
Country Port Throughput
United Kingdom London 1,932,000
United States Long Beach 6,061,091
United States Los Angeles 7,940,511
United States Oakland 2,342,504
United States Seattle 2,033,535
United States Houston 1,866,450
United States New York 5,503,485
United States Savannah 2,944,678
United States Hampton Roads 1,918,029
Vietnam Hai Phong 1,018,794
Vietnam Saigon Port 3,071,777
Table 2 Maritime chokepoints included in our representation of the maritime transportation network
Bering Strait Suez Canal Taiwan Strait Great Britain
Davis Strait Strait of Gibraltar Luzon Strait (northern tip)
Barents Sea Cape of Good Hope Magellan Passage Trinidad and Tobago
Strait of Hormuz Sunda Strait Dardanelles (northern tip)
Strait of Malacca Lombok Strait Dover Strait Yucatan Channel
Bab-el-Mandeb Tones Strait Øresund Windward Passage
Panama Canal Makassar Strait Great Australian Bight Mona Passage
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chokepoints always separate the single bodies of water from their neighbors. As a result,
the container ports are subdivided into eleven groups, corresponding to the adjacent
bodies of water: Pacific Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Caribbean Sea, North
Sea, Baltic Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Sea of Marmara, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and South
China Sea.
Because the maritime chokepoints in the network act as transshipment nodes for
longer routes, we only need to model the connections between seaports of each body of
water separately. Within each body of water, all possible pairwise connections are
implemented in the model, which makes each subnetwork of each body of water a
clique (i.e., a fully connected subset of nodes). The chokepoint nodes always count as
members of both neighboring cliques.
Figure 2 illustrates the adjacency matrix of the sea layer. Each block in the matrix
represents a different body of water and can be easily recognized in the white and grey
areas. The blue area shows the connections to, from and between the chokepoints.
There are a total of 1518 edges in the sea layer.
Road layer
The road layer plays a subordinate role in our network model; it is implemented to
provide a possibility of alternate routes for goods transported by sea. Whenever there is
a situation where the destination container port is out of order or a maritime chokepoint
along the route is impassable, a transfer to landside transportation of the road can be
considered.
For this layer, the nodes correspond to seaports, omitting the maritime chokepoints
as they have a meaning only for sea routes. Although it is theoretically possible to
travel by car between France, South Korea and South Africa without using any ferries,
not every road connection between two ports is required. Since road transportation is
expensive, it would only be used to bypass relative short distances, compared to those
within the sea layer. The purpose of the road layer will be either to deliver goods to the
Fig. 1 Portions of the sea layer (left) and road layer (right) as visualized in Google Earth. The red points are
the container ports and the yellow points represent the maritime chokepoints. The lines represent the direct
connections in between, visualized here simply as straight lines
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final destination or to the next functional seaport to switch back to ship transportation.
Therefore, we impose a maximum threshold for the road connections at 2000 nautical
miles, ignoring larger distances in the adjacency matrix.
Figure 3 provides a global overview of the layer. Here, North and South America are
recognizable on the left side with four connected components. Furthermore, there is a
large component connecting Europe, Northern Africa and Asia. Three other compo-
nents are in Taiwan, Japan and Australia, resulting in a total of eight connected
components. The resulting road layer contains 365 edges that connect the 83 seaports.
Edge distances
To make the model realistic, we seek for each edge a weight attribute that represents the
cost of using the edge on a route. In general, the relative costs for different modes of
transport are dramatically different. For example, according to Rodrigue et al. (2017)
the average transport cost per ton-mile (in 1995 dollars) for different modes were as
follows: water ($0.01), rail ($0.03), truck ($0.25), and air ($0.59). Zeihan (2014, p.12)
Fig. 2 Adjacency matrix of the sea layer. The block structure (in white and grey areas) results from the fully
connected nature of ports on the same body of water. The blue area shows interconnection of chokepoints
between each body of water
Fig. 3 Graphical representation of the road layer, arranged approximately on a Cartesian map of the world
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similarly reports, “Modern container ships can transport goods for about net 17 cents
per container-mile, compared to semitrailer trucks that do it for net $2.40, including the
cost of the locomotion mode as well as operating costs in both instances.” We adopt
these values as relative costs for each layer. In general, the biggest component of
transport cost is the amount of energy required, which depends on economies of scale
for each mode as well as the distance travelled.
To obtain the distance between pairs of nodes within each of the sea and
road layers, we collect real data using web scraping of public websites, in a
manner similar to that described in Section 3; for details see Funk (2017). For
the sea layer, we use the SeaRates website (SeaRates LP 2017). A potentially
more accurate method for calculating shortest sea route distances would be to
use the technique of Brown and Washburn (2017), but this was not considered
here. For the road layer, we collect the road distances automatically from the
websites for Bing Maps (Microsoft Corporation 2017) and Google Maps
(Google 2017). We record all of our calculated distances in nautical miles for
consistency.
We use an adjacency matrix for each layer to store its distance data. It has zeros on
the main diagonal and is symmetric because we assume that the direction of a route
between two nodes doesn’t influence the actual travel distance.
We weight the edges in our multiplex network by the product of this real world
travel distance and the relative cost factor for each mode of transport. Thus, our
representation of the GMTN allows us to consider the relative cost of moving cargo
in the sea layer and/or the road layer. In our subsequent analysis, we do not consider
transportation by rail or air.
Centrality analysis
As noted above, one of the topics studied in transportation networks is the centrality of
nodes. Centrality is a quantification of the intuitive notion of importance of a node in a
network, the answer of what is central depends on what is of interest. The standard
centrality measures can be classified as local versus global measures. The commonly
used local centrality measures are (1) degree centrality, which measures importance
within the 1-hop neighborhood, introduced by Shaw (1954); and (2) H-Index, used to
evaluate the scientific output of a researcher, introduced by Hirsch (2005). The
commonly used global centrality measures are (1) closeness centrality, which measures
how close a node is to every other node, introduced by Sabidussi (1966); (2)
betweenness centrality, which measures the percent of shortest paths for which
each node acts as an intermediate node, introduced by Freeman (1977); and (3)
different variations of decaying extensions of degree centrality based on the
distance to the node in questions: eigenvector centrality, introduced by Stephenson and
Zelen (1989); Katz centrality, introduced by Katz (1953); and PageRank, introduced by
Brin and Page (2012).
In studying the centrality of nodes in the GMTN, we consider each layer in isolation,
as well as the combination of the two layers. For each of the cases, we start by looking
at connectivity before performing a deeper analysis. We begin by considering each
network layer in isolation.
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Basic connectivity properties
The sea layer as a whole is a collection of eleven cliques, each interconnected to others
by one or more chokepoints. The biggest clique has 37 nodes representing the group of
very connected ports in the Pacific Ocean. This layer also has a highly assortative
community structure in terms of its node degree, with high-degree nodes connecting to
other high-degree nodes, and low-degree nodes connecting to other low-degree nodes.
The maximum degree centrality is 62, attained by several nodes representing maritime
chokepoints connecting Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea,
each of which contains many ports. The average degree of the sea layer is 25.3. Overall,
this layer is a clustered graph, with a clustering coefficient value of 0.9 (out of a
possible maximum of 1.0), which is very high. It thus presents a small world structure,
with average shortest path length is 2.2 (meaning that, on average, ships have to pass
1.2 chokepoints travelling between two ports), and the longest shortest path within the
layer has a length of five.
The road layer has very different connectivity properties, yet is still a small world.
The average degree of this layer is approximately 8.8. The maximum degree centrality
is 24 attained by Ambarli, Turkey; this node has a central location within its compo-
nent, being connected to all European ports and some of the Asian ports, and it has the
smallest degree of all nodes in the sea layer. The average shortest path length is 3,
measured within each component. The overall clustering coefficient of the road layer is
0.87, which is still high. This is because of the five small components, each of which
has a value of 1. The clustering coefficients for North America and Eurasia are 0.82 and
0.83, respectively. The high values follow from the fact of the selected threshold to
introduce distance-based edges to our model. Because of that, nodes are mostly
connected to others with a similar degree, like it is in the case in Europe, and there is
no connection to the weakly connected Middle East.
Identifying central nodes
As a first attempt to identify which nodes are “important” in our network, we consider
the degree centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality. The distributions
for the centralities of both layers appear in Fig. 4.
The degree centrality measures the number of one-hop connections, showing the
importance of a node locally. For the sea layer, nodes with the highest degree centrality
have a value of about 0.53; these correspond to the transition nodes between the Pacific
Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, that have the highest node degree.
Respectively, the nodes with the lowest degree have the lowest degree centrality of
about 0.01. A similar situation can be observed within the road layer, where Ambarli
has the highest centrality at about 0.29 and the nodes of the small connected compo-
nents have the lowest value of about 0.02.
Closeness centrality of a vertex can be viewed as the efficiency of the vertex in
spreading information to all other vertices. Thereby, the number of neighbors of a node
is less important for the closeness centrality, but rather the number of nodes within a
short distance from that node. The higher the closeness centrality is, the closer the node
is to all others. For both the sea and road layer, the five nodes with the highest closeness
centrality and highest degree centrality are the same (corresponding to the transition
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nodes between the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea), while the
other nodes present different degree versus closeness ranking.
The betweenness centrality is useful when studying the flow through a network, for
example, a flow of data packages or goods. To calculate the betweenness centralities in
our network, we use the weights of the edges representing the real sea distances
between the nodes. Within the sea layer, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and
Bab-el-Mandeb are by far the most central nodes, as they are chokepoints on the
shortest route between Asia and Europe. They are followed by the Strait of Malacca.
Surprisingly, the Panama Canal has a smaller rank than maybe expected (its importance
is based on its throughput, which is not taken into account in this centrality). For the
Fig. 4 Plots of centralities’ distributions of the sea and the road layer, respectively. The vertical axes represent
the centrality values on a scale from zero to one. The horizontal axes represent the network nodes in an
arbitrary order, which is consistent across all plots
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road layer, Karachi, Shenzhen and Ambarli have the highest values, not surprisingly,
since they act as hubs on many road routes in Asia and between Asia and Europe. In
both layers, many nodes have a value of zero, which means that their geographical
location does not qualify them as stops on routes between other nodes.
Network flow representation
A connectivity-based view of system structure can provide valuable insight, but the
GMTN is more than a simple network. In particular, it is a system that has evolved over
many years to deliver cargo reliably and at minimum cost. Its operations must satisfy
the need to move goods from areas of supply to areas of demand, while traversing long
distances and contending with capacity constraints at ports. Incorporating this
operating context into the study of a network-based infrastructure can be
fundamental to understanding its essential features, particularly when it comes to
identifying vulnerabilities and proposed investments (see Alderson 2008, Alderson
and Doyle 2010, for detailed discussions).
In this section, we expand our network model to reflect the flow of cargo through the
system. Specifically, we represent the GMTN as a multi-commodity, minimum-cost
network flow problem, in which the directed arcs in each layer of the network have a
per-unit flow cost as well as a capacity. For an introduction to the basic mathematical
framework for representing network models, see Ahuja et al. (1993). We additionally
apply the modeling techniques in Alderson et al. (2015) to evaluate system behavior
and operational resilience, both under normal conditions and during exigencies. We
detail the assumptions, formulation, and solution below.
Modeling port and chokepoint capacity
Container ports and canals in the real world can only process a finite number of ships
and containers in a fixed time period. This number is referred to as their capacity. A
study of the The Tioga Group (2010) provides a broad overview over port capacities of
the major U.S. ports, subdivided in North Atlantic, South Atlantic and Gulf Coast
regions. The container terminal capacity is measured in five “dimensions” such as berth
length and depth, number of berths and cranes, container yard acreage and the
operating hours of the ports (number of shifts). The study comes to a conclusion that
based on the five “dimensions,” ports have different capacities and the distribution of
strengths and weaknesses over the “dimensions” is different in each port. But in
general, each of the three regions on its own could handle roughly double of the actual
throughput before reaching its capacity constraints. Based on this study, we assume that
each port in our network has a capacity equal to double the normal throughput
(measured in TEUs).
In order to model capacity at ports and chokepoints, we adjust our existing network
as follows. First, we replace each undirected edge by two directed arcs, one in each
direction. Second, we use “node splitting”—where we replace a node with two copies
separated by a single directed arc—on ports and chokepoints. The example in Fig. 5
(left) illustrates the situation prior to node splitting, with undirected edges between the
nodes. It shows two container ports that have a direct sea connection in between (the
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blue edge), a connection via a maritime chokepoint and a road connection (the green
edge). Figure 5 (right) depicts the same situation after node splitting: each edge is
replaced by two bidirectional arcs with the exception of chokepoints. These are now
split in an incoming and an outgoing node with exactly one arc in between.
We can implement port capacity in the seaward or landward direction by restricting
the capacity on the corresponding directed arc between the split nodes. Similarly, we
can implement capacity through a chokepoint by restricting the flow on the directed
arc. At the extreme, we can disable a port or chokepoint by blocking all flow along
these directed arcs.
One way to implement a disruption on an arc could be remove it from the network,
or perhaps reduce its capacity to zero (which would have the same effect). However,
this has the potential to create infeasible network flows and can be problematic when
solving iteratively for solutions. Instead, we use “cost-based interdiction” and increase
the usage cost of each targeted arc as described in Alderson et al. (2014). In this way, a
targeted arc becomes too expensive and will not be considered for a solution.
Modeling supply and demand
As previously noted, Table 1 lists the annual throughput in each of our ports. We
augment this with additional data about the current export and import partners of the
countries that are represented in the model. Specifically, Table 10 in the Appendix lists
the total exports and imports by country, and Table 11 in the Appendix shows the
export and import partners of each country. The countries without ports in our model
Fig. 5 Two representations of layered networks. Left: A layered network consisting of sea connections (blue
edges) and road connections (green edges). Edges are undirected. Right: The same network with directed arcs
and “node splitting” to separate each port into a seaside node and a landside node, and to separate each
chokepoint into a inbound node and an outbound node. By placing flow constraints on the arcs connecting the
split nodes, we can restrict the capacity of flows through these nodes
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have been filtered out. Because there is no data provided for Puerto Rico, we assume
the same partners there as for the United States. Using this data, we derive approximate
cargo flows between different pairs of ports. We represent this data as a matrix of flows
between points of supply and points of demand within the network.
In our model, we do not distinguish between different types of cargo (everything is
simply measured in terms of TEUs), however we differentiate cargo with different
destinations as different types of commodities. That is, we assume that cargo destined
for Los Angeles cannot be substituted for cargo destined for Oakland. Thus, our matrix
of cargo flows defines the overall demand for cargo movement by commodity for the
GMTN.
Mathematical formulation
We next provide the mathematical formulation of the multi-commodity linear optimi-
zation model that minimizes the total cost of the global cargo flow. It preserves the
balance of flow at the nodes, allows for shortfall (undelivered cargo) at individual
nodes, and is instrumented to easily accommodate the interdiction (failure, closure) of
individual arcs.
Indices and Sets
n∈N nodes alias i; jð Þ
s∈S⊂N sea nodes
r∈R⊂N road nodes
N ¼ S∪R; S∩R ¼ ∅
i; jð Þ∈A directed arc from node i to node j
Data [Units]
cij per unit cost of traversing arc i; jð Þ∈A dollars=TEU½ 
uij upper bound on total directed flow on arc i; jð Þ∈A TEU½ 
x̂ij 1 if arc i; jð Þ∈A interdicted; 0 otherwise binary½ 
qij per unit penalty cost of traversing interdicted arc i; jð Þ∈A dollars=TEU½ 
drn demand at node n∈N for cargo originating from node r∈R TEU½ 
supply if drn < 0
 
pn per unit penalty cost for demand shortfall at node n∈N dollars=TEU½ 
Decision Variables [Units]
Y rij flow on arc i; jð Þ∈Aof cargo originating from noder∈R TEU½ 
Zrn shortfall of cargo originating from node r∈Rat noden∈N TEU½ 



















   ðD0Þ





Y rnj þ Zrn−Ern ¼ drn ∀n∈N ;∀r∈R ðD1Þ
0≤ ∑
r∈R
Y rij≤uij ∀ i; jð Þ∈A ðD2Þ
Y rij≥0 ∀ i; jð Þ∈A; ∀r∈R ðD3Þ
Zrn≥0 ∀n∈N ; ∀r∈R ðD4Þ
Ern≥0 ∀n∈N ; ∀r∈R ðD5Þ
Discussion
The objective function (D0) is a summation of costs that are generated by the model:
the combined flow cost over sea and road connections and the penalty cost for having a
demand shortfall or excess at some nodes. The constraint (D1) ensures the balance of
flow at each node and for each commodity, setting the incoming and the outgoing flow,
the shortfall and the excess equal to the demand at that node. Constraints (D2), (D3),
(D4) and (D5) define bounds on decision variables.
In practice, we only implement arc capacities uij on the arcs between “split” nodes
(i.e., seaports and chokepoints).
This is a prescriptive optimization model whose solution is the set of cargo flows
that satisfy, as best as possible given capacity limitations, the geographic demands for
transport at minimum cost. There are two types of costs. The first cost is the transport
cost of moving cargo across the arcs in the sea layer and/or road layer. Because the
costs in the sea layer are significantly lower than the for the road layer, the model will
primarily use the sea layer but revert to the road layer when necessary. The second cost
is a per-unit penalty cost that is incurred for any cargo that is not delivered to its
destination. In the event that significant disruption to the throughput capacity of a port
or chokepoint makes it impossible to deliver cargo to a given destination, the model
will suffer a high penalty. Overall, we set the costs so that the model will always deliver
cargo if possible, even if it means incurring potentially high costs to do so.
This model is instrumented with binary parameters x̂ij that make it easy for us to
interdict individual arcs (i.e., make them cost prohibitive to use). By changing the value
of x̂ij for one or more arcs and then re-solving the model, we observe how cargo flows
would reroute around the interdicted arcs. By iteratively changing these parameters and
re-solving this model, we can systematically assess the potential impact of a variety of
interdiction scenarios, which we detail in the next section.
Interdiction scenarios
We begin with an analysis of the system under normal operating conditions (i.e., no
interdictions of ports or chokepoints), a situation we refer to as the base case. The total
amount of cargo in the global network is 138,203,566 TEUs, and the corresponding
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“cost” to move this cargo is evaluated at $93,584,947,771. In this base scenario, all
cargo is delivered (i.e., there is no delivery shortfall) using the sea layer only (i.e., there
is no need to use the road network to supplement delivery). The computation time for
solving the base case on a personal laptop is approximately three seconds (ignoring
preprocessing time to load data from various files and postprocessing time to generate
figures, etc). The flow of the base case scenario is illustrated in Fig. 6 (top row), viewed
from different perspectives. It reveals the main routes of cargo transportation, distin-
guishable by the thick arcs around the globe. The most highly frequented routes are (1)
between North America and Europe across the Atlantic; (2) between Northern Europe
and Asia across the Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, Indian Ocean and the Strait of
Malacca; (3) between North America and Asia across the Atlantic, Cape of Good Hope
and the Indian Ocean; and (4) between North America and Asia across the Pacific
Ocean.
We use this base case scenario as a reference for three particular disruptions
scenarios of interest.
Interdiction of Suez Canal
The Suez Canal provides a vital means of transshipment between the Mediterranean
Sea and the Indian Ocean, and its interdiction has the potential to create considerable
disruption to global transport. With the Suez Canal interdicted, our model re-routes
flows in a manner that minimizes the incremental cost. Figure 6 (2nd row) illustrates
the resulting cargo flow, compared to the base case cargo flow in Fig. 6 (top row). The
interdicted Suez Canal is highlighted by the red symbol in the middle figure. On the
left, a slight increase of the flow between Asia and the Panama Canal can be detected,
as well as an increased flow between North America and Europe. In the middle, where
the Suez Canal is located, are the most significant changes. The flow between Europe
and Asia across the Red Sea is completely interrupted and instead takes place over the
Cape of Good Hope. The same applies for the flow between North America and Asia.
On the right, we observe two effects. First, most of the cargo from Asia is directed to
the Cape of Good Hope, instead of Bab-el-Mandeb (Mandeb Strait). Second, a greater
portion of this flow traverses the Sunda Strait, instead of the Strait of Malacca.
Table 3 provides the results of the interdiction. The increase in the total transporta-
tion cost is $6,355,097,051, which is about 6.8% of the base case cost. The reason for
the increase is longer transportation routes from origin to destination. As seen in Fig. 6
(2nd row), there is one road transportation arc (in green) that is utilized between
Ashdod, Israel and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. But the amount of flow there is so small
that none of the ports exhausts its capacity.
Interdiction of Panama Canal
The next scenario that we consider is an interdiction of the Panama Canal. Figure 6 (3rd
row) shows the clear flow changes in this scenario. On the left, we recognize the
decreased flow from Europe, but a significant increase from Cape of Good Hope to
North America. Furthermore, the transition through the Strait of Magellan has become
more important despite of the long way round for the most routes. In the middle, the
huge increase of ow in the southern hemisphere between Asia and North America
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across the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic is clear to see. This is confirmed by the figures
on the right, where the traffic through the Sunda Strait increased even more than in the
previous scenario. A decrease of flow across the Pacific is also recognizable.
Table 3 shows the increased transportation cost in this scenario, which here is 10.3%
higher than in the base case. On both ends of the Panama Canal (Pacific and the
Fig. 6 Comparative results for Four Scenarios. Top Row: Base case scenario (no interdictions). Second Row:
Suez Canal failure scenario. Third Row: Panama Canal failure scenario. Last Row: Straits of Malacca failure
scenario
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Caribbean Sea) container ports are located in our model. These are the port of Balboa
and the Manzanillo International Terminal. The increase of the road transportation
portion of flow comes from increased cargo along the road connection between the two
ports (until the port capacities are exhausted).
Interdiction of Strait of Malacca
The last single interdiction scenario we consider is a blockade of the Strait of Malacca.
The effects of the interdiction are hardly recognizable in Fig. 6 (bottom row). In Asia
(on the left), we observe a simple shift of traffic from the Strait of Malacca to the Sunda
Strait. This result also appears in Table 3. The increase in the total transportation cost is
approximately 2.2%, compared to the base case. There is no road transportation or ports
with exhausted capacity result from the interdiction. The Sunda Strait seems to be a
good substitute of the Strait of Malacca.
Identifying most critical nodes
We now consider a different question: which nodes, if interdicted, yield the biggest
increase in system cost? Such nodes are often called the “most vital” or “most critical”
nodes in the system (see Alderson et al. 2013, for brief history). To evaluate this, we
exhaustively enumerate each possible scenario with exactly one interdicted port or
maritime chokepoint. Table 4 lists the top ten nodes with greatest increase to the total
transportation cost. The most expensive scenario is a failure of the port in Busan, which
is the sixth biggest port in the world. If Busan is interdicted, all the cargo to and from
this port is transported through the closest ports, which are far away and do not have
sufficient capacity for this amount of redirected cargo. Therefore, three closest ports
exhaust their capacity until all cargo demands are satisfied. This creates a lot of
expensive road transportation and further increases the total cost of the scenario.
Similar behavior is observed for scenarios associated with the interdiction of other
ports in the table. Interdictions to maritime chokepoints result in less road transporta-
tion, in general, but they cause instead long detours and thus increase the total cost.
There are several single-node interdiction scenarios that result in a shortfall of cargo
for some nodes. This happens mostly to interdicted ports on islands that don’t have
adjacent ports on the same island. Then there is no alternative route for transportation.
Since our model sets a very high penalty cost on having a shortfall, it is not realistic to
add this artificial cost to the total cost. But in reality, the penalty cost for undelivered
Table 3 Relative comparison of global flows between normal operations and three failure scenarios






total transportation “cost” $93,584,947,771 $99,940,044,822 $103,200,517,821 $95,682,578,400
total shortfall/excess O TEU O TEU O TEU O TEU
portion of road transportation 0% 0.1% 0.8% 0%
ports with exhausted capacity 0 0 2* 0
*Balboa, Panama; Manzanillo International Terminal, Panama
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cargo can still be very high. Table 5 provides an overview of the resulting shortfall in
some scenarios.
We are now prepared to answer an important question: Are the most “critical” nodes,
as indicated by our flow model, also the most “central” or the ones with the biggest
throughput? Table 6 lists the twenty nodes whose loss results in the highest increase in
total flow cost. For each node, we also list its rank as a “central” node, as defined by
betweenness centrality, along with its rank in terms of annual throughput (for ports
only). Although this table generally includes the most central nodes and the ports with
the highest throughput, we observe that being a central node or a port with high
throughput is not sufficient, on its own, to contribute to being a critical node.
Specifically, we observe several ports, such as Savannah, Houston, Bandar Abbas,
and Cartagena, that are neither among the top 20 most central nodes nor among the
ports with the highest throughput but are critical from the flow perspective. This is
often because there may not be nearby port alternatives in the event that these ports
become disabled.
Multiple interdictions
As an extension to the previous analysis, we take a closer look at scenarios with
multiple port interdictions. We expect that, depending on the combination of nodes that
are affected, the total impact of multiple interdictions might be greater than just the sum
of the single scenario impacts. If two closed ports are in the same area, they serve as
substitutes for one another. This way, farther ports need to process cargo for multiple
ports and the transportation cost might explode. In this subsection we only consider
port failures, that is, we assume that maritime chokepoints are always available for use.
First, we evaluate a specific scenario that reminds of the West Coast port labor
lockout in 2002. For the scenario, we close three major U.S. ports: Long Beach, Los
Angeles and Oakland. These ports constitute a major portion in North America’s West
Coast logistics network. Since the ports have a big total cumulative throughput and
they are located close to each other, we expect a lot of road transportation and therefore
high cost.
Table 4 Nodes with the highest transportation cost increase compared to the base case
Rank Closed node Cost increase Road portion Exhausted ports
1 Busan 19.66% 5.79% 3
2 Strait of Gibraltar 15.45% 1.83% 3
3 Jawaharlal Nehru Port 11.50% 1.08% 3
4 Port of Shanghai 10.87% 4.14% 2
5 Panama Canal 10.27% 0.78% 2
6 Strait of Hormuz 9.16% 1.87% 0
7 New York 9.00% 2.18% 2
8 Bab-el-Mandeb 8.57% 0.11% 0
9 Shenzhen 8.16% 3.17% 2
10 Dubai 6.83% 1.61% 3
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The resulting flow in Fig. 7 confirms our expectations. On the left, it shows many
thick road transportation arcs across North America. All West Coast ports in Canada
and Mexico are busy supporting the three ports. Even the ports at the east coast are
involved in processing the cargo of the interdicted ports. Both other perspectives
indicate an increase in sea transportation routes between North American’s East
Coast ports and both continents Europe and Asia.
The results in Table 7 emphasize the visual observation from the map. The road
transportation flow has increased to 8.3%. Due to this fact, the total transportation cost
in the scenario is 80.7% higher than in the base case. This increase in value is caused by
just about 3% of the ports. Six container ports in Canada, Mexico and the U.S. exhaust
their capacities while supporting the interdicted ports. Additional port failures in North
America would most likely cause shortfalls because the cumulative capacity would be
exhausted there.
Finding meaningful combinations of failing ports is a challenging task, because too
many possible combinations exist to search exhaustively. Although the Attacker-
Defender techniques in Alderson et al. (2014) could be used to identify worst-case
interdictions without enumeration, we do not use them here. Instead, we restrict our
analysis to exactly two concurrent failing ports and evaluate every possible combina-
tion to produce a ranking similar to that for single interdictions. Having 94 container
ports in the model, this means considering a total of 4371 scenarios which takes about
six days of total computation time.
Table 8 lists the twenty two-port combinations that cause the highest increase to
transportation costs. The worst scenario by far is the scenario involving the failure of
Long Beach and Los Angeles ports, which results in a 52.2% cost increase. The second
and third positions, involving scenarios of failures in the Malay Peninsula and in China,
are considerably less costly. In the further positions, the cost decrease smoothly towards
the end of the table.
Although the highest value is caused by U.S. ports, the port of Busan is represented
disproportionately in the first twenty positions. The reason is that this port caused the
Table 5 Single-node interdic-
tions resulting in cargo shortfalls
Rank Closed node Total scenario shortfall (in TEU)









10 San Juan 764,339
11 Freeport 638,784
12 Las Palmas 555,731
13 Strait of Hormuz 4
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highest cost increase in the single interdiction scenarios. It is surprising that the worst
two-port interdictions are not only ports that are located near to each other, but also
include some combinations of ports from different continents. The highest road portion
value of all scenarios is 8.75% and at most six ports exhaust their capacities in each
scenario.
Increased use of Arctic Sea routes
The last analysis in this section concerns the Arctic sea routes. As mentioned earlier, the
Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage are currently usable only for a few
months of a year because of the ice. Therefore, only a few ships per year choose these
routes and therefore we have set an artificial capacity there at 18 ships per year. But due
to climate change and melting arctic ice, the availability of these routes could increase.
Then they would become more attractive for shipping companies, because in some
cases they are shorter than the routes used today. To investigate this statement, we
increase the capacity of the arctic routes and observe the resulting impact to the global
transportation system. As an example, we decide for the current throughput of the port
Table 6 Comparing different indicators of node importance. For each of the top 20 most “critical” nodes, we
list their rank in terms of being “central” or having the most port throughput (in TEUs). A ‘-’ indicates that the
node was not in the top 20. Chokepoints (listed in bold) do not have port throughput. In general, we observe
that neither node centrality or node throughput is sufficient to predict criticality in terms of cargo flow
RANK
Node Most “critical” Most “central” Most port throughput
Busan 1 18 4
Strait of Gibraltar 2 1
Jawaharlal Nehru Port 3 – 26
Port of Shanghai 4 – 1
Panama Canal 5 6
Strait of Hormuz 6 15
New York 7 19 23
Bab-el-Mandeb 8 3
Shenzhen 9 – 3
Dubai 10 – 8
Suez Canal 11 2
Singapore 12 9 2
Savannah 13 – 39
Jeddah 14 – 27
Qingdao 15 – 7
Houston 16 – 66
Bandar Abbas 17 – 40
Tianjin 18 – 10
Cartagena 19 – 67
Øresund 20 –
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of Los Angeles and implement it at the common entrance of both arctic routes—the
Bering Strait.
The resulting cargo traffic is presented in Fig. 8. Not surprisingly, we observe that
both Arctic arcs are utilized much more than in the base case. The figures in the left
columns show, that the flow from Asia to the Panama Canal has decreased. In general,
there exists less cargo between the Panama Canal and the U.S. East Coast. The East
Coast is now supplied better by the Northwest Passage than before. The perspective on
the right column substantiates the reduced ow between Asia and the Mediterranean Sea.
A great portion of the flow from Asia is now directed to the Bering Strait and from
there further to the arctic routes.
Table 9 shows the corresponding numbers of this last scenario. The total
transportation cost is about 3.6% lower than in the base case scenario. This is
a considerable savings of money and fuel for global transportation, if we
assume the same transportation cost through the arctic routes as for all other
routes. The result also shows that the scenario has exhausted the capacity of
the Bering Strait. This means that the arctic routes most likely would carry
even more cargo in the optimal solution, if we allow a higher capacity in the
Bering Strait.
Conclusion and future work
This paper presents a multilayer network model that we use to study the structure and
behavior of the GMTN. We analyze the network from a connectivity perspective and
also construct a model of cargo flows that includes transportation costs and capacity
constraints. We systematically assess the impact of closing one or more seaports and/or
maritime chokepoints, and use this to identify the most “critical” nodes in the network.
Fig. 7 Comparison of the base and the West Coast ports failure scenario
Table 7 Result of the interdiction





total transportation cost $169,079,946,490
total shortfall/excess 0 TEU
portion of road transportation 8.3%
ports with exhausted capacity 6*
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We also show how this framework can be used to consider other “what-if” types of
questions, such as increased transportation capacity through the Arctic Circle. We show
that this type of analysis provides realistic, insightful, and computationally tractable
results regarding the security and resilience of the GMTN. Yet, there is considerable
room for improvements and additional research.
First, this analysis would benefit from data that is more detailed and more realistic.
Although we were able to construct a relatively complete picture of global flows using
data from public sources, there exist private databases (commensurate with the data
used by global shipping companies to manage these operations) that would enable a
more accurate view of current operations and potential contingencies in the face of a
major disruptive event.
Second, there are considerably more operational constraints than are represented
here. For example, sea transport is often closely coordinated with landside connections
such that it might not be logistically feasible or cost effective for a container ship to
divert to an alternative port. Although we differentiate cargo commodity by destination,
we do not consider different types of cargo. In practice, for example, refrigerated cargo
has additional constraints both at sea and ashore. And there may be different priorities
of cargo that need to be considered when modeling port operations. Moreover, the
operations within a port have additional dependencies that include, among other things,
the availability of individual cranes and terminals. Thus, disruptions within a port are
not simply binary as represented here, and additional work is required to understand
Table 8 Highest cost increase for double interdictions
rank closed node cost increase road portion exhausted ports
1 Long Beach, Los Angeles 52.20% 5.98% 6
2 Port Klang, Singapore 36.38% 5.71% 6
3 Guangzhou, Shenzhen 33.25% 4.17% 2
4 Ningbo, Port of Shanghai 32.95% 5.35% 4
5 New York, Savannah 30.44% 3.46% 4
6 Busan, Port of Shanghai 29.90% 8.75% 5
7 Singapore, Tanjung Pelepas 29.31% 5.02% 5
8 Busan, New York 28.67% 6.71% 5
9 Busan, Shenzhen 27.82% 7.61% 5
10 Busan, Dalian 27.69% 6.02% 3
11 Busan, Kwangyang 27.53% 6.34% 3
12 Busan, Tianjin 26.73% 7.13% 4
13 Busan, Dubai 26.50% 6.45% 6
14 Busan, Incheon 25.71% 5.94% 3
15 Busan, Singapore 25.21% 8.61% 5
16 Busan, Savannah 25.11% 5.96% 4
17 Busan, Qingdao 24.89% 6.42% 4
18 Busan, Houston 24.70% 5.68% 3
19 Hampton Roads, New York 23.78% 2.89% 3
20 Busan, Cartagena, New York 23.51% 5.28% 4
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how the loss of different sets of components can adversely affect port operations; see
De la Cruz (2011), Mintzer (2014), or Wenke (2015) for examples.
Third, ongoing pressure for economies of scale is driving the design of bigger and
bigger cargo ships, with the newest Ultra Large Container Vessel ships now able to be
serviced at only a few megaports (further separating them from the others). In practice,
it might not be possible for these ships to go elsewhere (thus resulting in more
systemwide fragility). Understanding the tensions between this ongoing drive for
Fig. 8 Comparison of the base case (top row) and the increased availability of Arctic routes (botton row)
Table 9 Results of the increased
capacity in the arctic sea routes
Scenario Results Table
total transportation cost $90,178,602,508
total shortfall/excess 0 TEU
portion of road transportation 0%
ports with exhausted capacity –
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“faster, better, cheaper” transport and the need for a system that is resilient in the face of
surprise is a topic of open investigation.
Finally, understanding the potential impact of Arctic sea opening, sea level rise, and
other climatic changes serve as potentially fruitful and important avenues for future
research.
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Appendix. Additional Data Tables
Table 10 Exports and imports of the countries of the model. Source: Central intelligence Agency (2017)
Country Exports Imports
Argentina $58.4 billion $57.23 billion
Australia $184.3 billion $203.1 billion
Bahamas $880 million $2.495 billion
Bangladesh $33.32 billion $39.17 billion
Belgium $250.8 billion $251.7 billion
Brazil $189.7 billion $143.9 billion
Canada $402.4 billion $419 billion
China $2.011 trillion $1.437 trillion
Colombia $33.64 billion $47.15 billion
Ecuador $16.77 billion $17.74 billion
Egypt $14.73 billion $50.07 billion
France $505.4 billion $5252.4 billion
Germany $1.283 trillion $987.6 billion
India $271.6 billion $402.4 billion
Indonesia $136.7 billion $121.5 billion
Iran $87.52 billion $62.12 billion
Ireland $160.1 billion $88.01 billion
Israel $51.61 billion $57.9 billion
Italy $436.3 billion $372.2 billion
Jamaica $1.278 billion $ 3.772 billion
Japan $641.4 billion $629.8 billion
Korea, South $509 billion $405.1 billion
Lebanon $3.108 billion $17.98 billion
Malaysia $167.3 billion $139.5 billion
Malta $2.915 billion $4.479 billion
Mexico $359.3 billion $372.8 billion
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Table 10 (continued)
Country Exports Imports
Morocco $18.72 billion $33.15 billion
Netherlands $460.1 billion $376.3 billion
Oman $30.39 billion $25.78 billion
Pakistan $20.96 billion $38.25 billion
Panama $15.19 billion $22.08 billion
Peru $38.09 billion $38.35 billion
Philippines $38.2 billion $60.95 billion
Puerto Rico $70.41 billion $47.61 billion
Russia $259.3 billion $165.1 billion
Saudi Arabia $205.3 billion $157.7 billion
Singapore $353.3 billion $271.3 billion
South Africa $83.16 billion $85.03 billion
Spain $266.3 billion $287.9 billion
Sri Lanka $10.12 billion $18.64 billion
Taiwan $314.8 billion $248.7 billion
Thailand $190 billion $171.3 billion
Turkey $150.1 billion $197.8 billion
United Arab Emirates $316 billion $246.9 billion
United Kingdom $412.1 billion $581.6 billion
United States $1.471 trillion $2.205 trillion
Vietnam $169.2 billion $161 billion
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